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Re´sume´
Ce papier analyse la strate´gie d’un e´diteur de logiciel vis-a`-vis du piratage. Dans un contexte
d’adoption caracte´rise´e par une incertitude sur la qualite´ (bien d’expe´rience) et des couˆts de piratage
he´te´roge`nes, un e´diteur peut choisir le prix et la qualite´ du logiciel distribue´ ainsi qu’un niveau d’effort
ou de surveillance des utilisateurs. Les utilisateurs peuvent choisir de pirater ou d’acheter le logiciel de
l’e´diteur durant l’une des deux pe´riodes conside´re´es ou de ne pas l’adopter. Entre les deux pe´riodes, un
me´canisme de bouche-a`-oreille permet de re´ve´ler imparfaitement la qualite´ du logiciel. Dans ce contexte,
nous montrons sous quelles conditions une politique de tole´rance vis-a`-vis du piratage peut eˆtre profitable
pour l’e´diteur. Nous envisageons aussi la possibilite´ pour un e´diteur d’annoncer des niveaux de prix et
de surveillance futurs qu’il n’appliquerait pas parfaitement durant la deuxie`me pe´riode d’adoption. Une
telle politique, faussement permissive en matie`re de piratage, s’ave`re encore plus efficace. Ne´anmoins,
seule la politique permissive vis-a`-vis du piratage demeure robuste de`s lors qu’on augmente le niveau de
sophistication des anticipations des utilisateurs quant a` l’appre´hension de la strate´gie de l’e´diteur.
Classification JEL : D43, D83, K42, L15
Mots-cle´s : strate´gie de distribution d’un logiciel, piratage, bien d’expe´rience, fausses annonces
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the distribution strategy of a software publisher. The user adoption
context is characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good)and heterogeneous piracy costs.
Users can purchase or get unauthorized/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods
(or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can acquire information through word-of-mouth.
To maximize profit, the publisher needs to decide about price, quality and level of monitoring of piracy.
We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the prod-
uct. We add to the literature by explicitly considering the opportunity for the publisher to cheat about
future price and monitoring levels (misleading announcements). This strategy that is falsely permissive
towards piracy, can sometimes appear more profitable. However, when the degree of sophistication of user
expectations about the publisher’s strategy increases, only a strategy that is permissive (with respect to
piracy) with non misleading announcements remains robust.
JEL Codes: D43, D83, K42, L15
Keywords: software distribution strategy, piracy, experience good, misleading announcements
∗Universite´ de Rennes 1 - CREM - CNRS, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex, France. E-mail:
eric.darmon@univ-rennes1.fr
†Universite´ Nice Sophia-Antipolis - GREDEG - CNRS, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne,
France. E-mail: alexandra.rufini@gredeg.cnrs.fr, dominique.torre@gredeg.cnrs.fr
1
1 Introduction
Since the early 2000, the massive adoption of information and communication technologies
(ICT) by firms and households has had a major impact on the production and distribu-
tion strategies of producers of digital goods (software, cultural goods, media/newspaper,
etc.). Because of the intrinsic characteristics of such goods (non rivalry, lower distribution
costs, increasing returns to scale), this massive adoption has increased the opportunities
and the risks for digital good producers (see Shapiro and Varian [1998] for a seminal
analysis). In particular, these risks seem to be magnified as reproduction costs diminish
(or disappear) and as the degree of vertical differentiation between the original good and
the copy is very low. Although concerns about piracy existed even before the diffusion
of ICT(see e.g. Conner and Rumelt [1991] for a seminal theoretical analysis of copy-
ing and Varian [2005] for a review of this literature), their use (because of the relative
easiness to use of downloading platforms such as e.g. peer-to-peer networks) has often
been considered a facilitator for distributing digital goods (whether legally or illegally).
Thus, the negative effects on sales and then profit are often pointed out in these industries.
However, file-sharing networks and online communities also generate new opportuni-
ties for profit. Thanks to the diffusion of ICT, increasing the connectivity between users
has become much cheaper , which, in turn, induces new network effects or reinforces
existing ones. Digital goods producers can then profitably exploit the existence of such
externalities (e.g. increase in users’ willingness to pay, opportunities to lock-in users) that
overall impact positively on their profits. There is a growing literature that investigates
these effects and studies how piracy and profit may be reconciled depending on the type
of good - mainly software, music and video (see Belleflamme and Peitz [2010]) - and on
the demand characteristics (see Peitz and Waelbroeck [2006a]). This article focuses on
the case of software. Software typically display several types of network externalities:
compatibility-driven externalities either direct or indirect (i.e. compatibility with a com-
plementary software that generates indirect revenues), and especially information driven
externalities notably (see Peitz and Waelbroeck [2006a] for a complete description of all
potential externalities).
Here we focus on informational externalities. As well as being non-material, software
is also most frequently an experience good (Nelson [1970]). For that reason, users may
need additional information to evaluate the benefits associated with software use. This
additional knowledge about software quality in turn may foster software adoption. For
that reason, software publishers often use freeware or shareware distribution strategies.
Both are based on versioning through the distribution of limited versions (with respect
to time or functionalities) to help to reveal to users the exact quality of the software (see
Haruvy and Prasad [2005] for a survey). The tacit assumption behind such strategies is
that an individual test (also described as direct sampling) can decrease individual learn-
ing costs and reduce the information asymmetry in product quality. Although monitoring
the distribution of a unauthorized good is more difficult, a “permissive” strategy towards
piracy could have the same effect on individual learning.1.
1cf. e.g. Stolpe [2000] for an early empirical analysis showing that some software publishers lower
their efforts about software protection if the magnitude of software externalities is perceived to be high.
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Our paper builds on the literature on sampling2. Several theoretical papers study the
effect of direct sampling in the case of a monopolistic market (cf. Peitz and Waelbroeck
[2006b], Gopal et Bhattacharjee [2006], Ducheˆne and Waelbroeck [2005]). However, as
Takeyama [2009]notes, these contributions often do not investigate the precise effect of
another type of sampling (indirect sampling). Because ICT use decreases the costs of
communication among users, information flows between potential users of a software are
intensified which increases the scale of the sampling effect. Thus, Takeyama [2009] pro-
poses a model that integrates an indirect sampling effect and shows that the strategic
introduction of unauthorized copies through piracy, in some cases can reduce information
asymmetry. Also, her model assumes that an illegal copy has the same marginal cost
for each user and that original and illegal software are vertically differentiated. Besides,
the distribution between pirates and legal consumers is either governed by an exogenous
parameter or perfectly monitored by the software publisher. Our model builds on this
literature but relaxes some of these restrictive assumptions. In particular, we fully endo-
genize the tradeoff between piracy (unauthorized software use), legal purchase and non
adoption. We assume also that potential software users are heterogeneous vis-a`-vis the
cost associated with piracy. This may be grounded either on heterogeneous technical skills
and/or on different moral attitudes towards illegal activities such as illegal downloading.
In our model, the software publisher has the opportunity to select an effort level to moni-
tor piracy (e.g. using more or less restrictive protecting devices). This monitoring policy
is publicly known and influence users’ attitudes to piracy. However, when the monitoring
policy is not fully enforced, the choice of whether to get unauthorized copies or not is
endogenous. We also consider a two-stage model to capture the idea that the software
publisher is able to revise its price and piracy-monitoring strategies. This two-step model
also enables us to consider the timing of adoption: to our knowledge, this possibility is
not considered in the piracy literature although is an issue in the software industry. We
include the opportunity for the software publisher to make strategic announcements about
its future price and piracy monitoring strategies.
In this setting, we show that a software publisher may have an incentive to implement
a permissive strategy regarding piracy behaviours i.e. to tolerate a moderate level of
piracy of its software during the pre-adoption (i.e. first) stage. We show that this first
strategy contributes to information disclosure and increases users’ willingness to pay for
the legal product. We show also that a second strategy may be available to the software
publisher. This consists in making an announcement about a future permissiveness to-
wards piracy. However, this announcement is misleading i.e. the publisher deliberately
cheats about the future levels of price and monitoring: the levels implemented will be
different from those announced to users. This second strategy may be even more bene-
ficial for the software publisher than the permissive strategy. In this case, legal buyers
disclose information during the pre-adoption stage and those users who planned to get
unauthorized copies of the software later are eventually induced to buy it at the higher
2As Liebowitz [2005] points out, the sampling effect was originally referred to as the ‘exposure effect’
in the literature and consists in experiencing a good (that is downloading in the context of a digital good)
before adoption. Hence, sampling is a way for users to check that the experienced item matches their
tastes and preferences. Although sampling was first designed for music/video items and thought at an
individual scale (i.e. a user tests and potentially adopts the item), this notion has thus be extended
to account for all types of digital (experience) goods and word-of-mouth diffusion (i.e. a user tests and
disclose information to another user) thus generating network effects.
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price. Since the publisher’s announcements are not implemented, the strategy based on
cheating no longer holds in a context of more sophisticated user expectations and the first
type of strategy is robust to increases in the sophistication of user expectations.
Section 2 presents the Model. Section 3 presents the potential adoption equilibrium
outcomes and strategies. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2 The model
The model focuses on the behaviour and the strategic decisions of a software publisher
that aims to launch a new software in the market. We consider software as an experience
good, so its characteristics are only imperfectly observable. In that context, potential
users have to decide whether or not to adopt the new software proposed by the software
publisher. If they decide to adopt, they need also to decide about the right time for
adoption and how to acquire the software (buying legally or getting unauthorized copies
of the software).
2.1 The software publisher
We consider a two-period model. The publisher determines the price pt of the software at
each time period t (t = {1, 2}) and its quality level q, q ∈ [0, q¯]. Below the quality level
b (0 < b < q¯), the software provides basic functionalities only. When this quality level is
reached, the software is endowed with advanced functionalities, which are unobservable
before use.
The production cost of the software, denoted C(q), is positively related to its quality
level. For simplicity,3 we suppose that C(q) = C when q ∈ [0, b], and C(q) = C¯, (C < C¯),
when q ∈]b, q¯].
The publisher is able indirectly to influence the level of piracy (unauthorized use)
of its software by enforcing some monitoring of piracy behaviours. The intensity of this
monitoring is measured by λt (λt ∈ [0, 1]). For each time period t = {1, 2}, this monitoring
level λt corresponds to the probability of a user of being caught using unauthorized copies
of the software. The lowest monitoring level (λt = 0) corresponds to a zero probability
of being caught ; the highest monitoring level (λt = 1) means that being caught is a
certain event for pirate users. This monitoring is assumed to be costless for the publisher.
This assumption ensures that potential piracy permissiveness is not caused by the cost of
monitoring supported by the software publisher.
In our model, the software publisher publicly announces, at time 1, its price policy and
her attitude toward piracy for the two periods. Hence, the publisher announces the levels
of price p1 and monitoring λ1 at time 1, but also the level of price p
a
2 and the monitoring
level λa2 which could be applied at time 2.
2.2 Potential users
There are m potential software users uniformly distributed in the segment [c, c¯]. We de-
note ci, (i = 1, 2 . . .m), the piracy cost of the potential user i. This cost can vary from
3This assumption enables us to treat quality as a discrete binary variable. This considerably simplifies
the mathematical treatment of the model without qualitative incidences on the propositions stated here.
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one user to another given technical factors (heterogeneous technical ability to get unau-
thorized copies of the software), psychological factors (different morale attitudes toward
unauthorized activities and their potential sanctions) or cultural factors (different social
environments which approve/disapprove more or less of piracy behaviours).
Each potential user, supposed risk-neutral, could adopt the software at time 1 or at
time 2, by either buying or getting unauthorized copies of it (piracy). Once acquired,
the software can be further without any additional charge. If some users do not adopt
the new software (further “reservation strategy”), they draw the utility level b¯, associated
with the use of an old generation of software. At time 1, users imperfectly estimate the
characteristics of the software. They expect the utility associated with the quality of the
software q at the level qe.
To avoid trivial individual choices, we formulate two assumptions.
Assumption 1. If the new software provides only basic functionalities, the old software
provides a level of utility at least as high as provided by the new software, such that b ≤ b¯.
This assumption eliminates the case where only the basic functionalities would ensure
the adoption of the software, making the adoption problem trivial. Also, given that ad-
vanced functionalities are not observable, the expected quality level qe has to be bounded.
If the users’ expectations are too pessimistic (i.e. such that qe < b¯) the reservation strat-
egy always dominates other strategies and no user would ever adopt. Conversely, if they
are too optimistic (qe > q¯) delayed adoption (i.e. adoption at time 2) would never occur.
Hence, potential users’ expectations cannot be higher than the maximum quality set by
the publisher. Assumption 2 preserves the possibility of early and/or delayed adoption.
Assumption 2. The maximum quality level of the new software expected by users is
bounded by the maximum quality level set by the publisher and provides a higher level of
utility than the utility level provided by the older-generation software, such that b¯ ≤ qe ≤ q¯.
Let mu1 denote the number of early adopters, i.e. the users who adopt the software
at time 1, with 0 ≤ mu1 ≤ 1. Once early users have adopted, information about the
quality of the software diffuses to potential users through a word-of-mouth process. This
defines an informational externality that we suppose is proportional to the number of
early adopters. This information disclosure leads other potential users to correct their
estimation of quality by an amount of k(mu1/m)(q−qe), (where k measures the magnitude
of the information diffusion (0 ≤ k ≤ 1).
At each time, potential users take into account all the available information (price,
monitoring level, software quality) to make their current decision (reservation, buying the
software or getting unauthorized copies of it) in order to maximize their intertemporal
utility. Here we consider basic expectations: users do not anticipate that the software
publisher will lie in announcing future price levels and monitoring levels. The case of
more sophisticated types of expectations is discussed in Section 4.
2.3 The structure of the sequential game
• At time 0, the software publisher determines the level of the control variables
{p1, p2, pa2, λ1, λ2, λa2, q} that maximizes its non-discounted intertemporal profit.4
4We could have considered a discount factor on profit. However, introducing this parameter would
not change results qualitatively (types of equilibrium strategies and outcomes).
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The publisher announces publicly levels of price and monitoring {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2}.
• At time 1, potential users make their current decisions (reservation, buying the
software or getting unauthorized copies of it) maximizing their intertemporal utility
(sum of the instantaneous non-actualized utility levels), given the available infor-
mation on the control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2} and their current estimations about
software quality qe. Adoption decisions are enforced immediately.
• A time 2, the software publisher implements the monitoring level λ2 and proposes
the price p2. The levels of these control variables were chosen at time 0 but could be
different from those previously announced. Potential users that did not adopt during
time 1 revise their decisions given the available information about software quality
and given the price and the monitoring levels actually implemented by the publisher.
Announcements are said to be ‘non misleading’ if pa2 = p2 and λ
a
2 = λ2, and misleading
otherwise. In the latter case, and because of the structure of the game (i.e. no new
piece of information or no state of nature intervene between the two adoption periods for
the software publisher), the software publisher’s strategy would be based on deliberate
cheating since the publisher would know at the beginning of the game that it would never
implement at time 2 the announcements made at time 1.
The intertemporal non-actualized profit of the software publisher is defined by (1):
pi(p1, p2, p
a
2, λ1, λ2, λ
a
2, q) = m
s
1(p1, p
a
2, λ1, λ
a
2, q)p1
+ms2(p2, λ2, q)p2 − C(q)
(1)
where ms1(p1, p
a
2, λ1, λ
a
2, q) and m
s
2(p2, λ2, q) are the number of pieces of software sold at
time 1 and time 2 respectively.
The timing of adoption defines a sequential game where the publisher plays first and
integrates the optimal intertemporal responses of potential users in its decisions. In so
doing, the publisher includes the revision process of users’ expectations and decisions. The
resulting values of the control variables for both publisher and potential users are depicted
by the Stackelberg equilibrium and we consider the perfect sub-game Nash equilibria.
3 Results
First, we study the choices of users given the piracy costs. From that, we deduce the
potential distributions of users among the possible strategies (buying, piracy, reservation):
each defines an ‘outcome’ of the game. Second, we select, among all the potential outcomes
of the game, those that match the publisher’s optimal decisions and focus on the cases
where piracy is (rationally) accommodated by the software publisher.
3.1 Users’ strategies and outcomes of the game
At each time, potential users determine, revise or confirm their strategies, given the levels
of the observed and announced variables and given their piracy cost.
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For a given set of the control variables, the outcomes of the game are determined
according to the adoption time structure. First, potential users choose at time 1 to adopt
or not and how to to adopt (buying the software or getting unauthorized copies of it).
Second, those who do not adopt the software at time 1, choose again at time 2 among
the different actions (buying, getting unauthorized copies of the software, reservation).
Because potential users have heterogeneous piracy costs, they may not always choose the
same strategy at a given time period.
3.1.1 Possible outcomes of the game
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the software publisher initially chooses a quality level q,
(0 ≤ q ≤ q¯), and potential users can select one of the five strategies at time 1 (1.1, 1.2,
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5) depicted by Figure 1. Note that each strategy is associated with a payoff
depending on the parameters b¯, qe, c, c¯ and on the announced values of the control vari-
ables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2}.
Buying Piracy Reservation
- -
Buying
Piracy
Reservation
2qe − p1 2qe − λ1ci
b¯+ qe − pa2
b¯+ qe − λa2ci
2b¯1.1 1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Action at
time 1
Planned action
at time 1
for time 2
Expected
payoffs
at time 1
Figure 1: User i’s decision tree at time 1
At time 2, the users’ estimation of the quality of the software may change. Early
adopters (buyers and/or hackers) may decide not to adopt the software if its quality is
not associated with a level of utility greater than b¯. In this case, information diffuses to
those users who have not yet adopted and the expected quality of the software is damaged.
However, this possible re-use of the previous software by early adopters does not impact
on their actions (buying or piracy) since those actions are forgone. Nor does it impact
directly on the publisher’s profit (no possible refund). However, note that it may impact
on this profit indirectly since unfavourable word-of-mouth information may drive users’
expectations down.
For that reason, we concentrate on the decisions of those potential users who did not
adopt at time 1. Those who chose Strategies 1.3, 1.4 or 1.5 may, at time 2, confirm or
revise their previous choice. At time 2, the same three options are available to them:
buying the software, getting unauthorized copies of it or definitively not adopting. The
choice of those users is depicted in Figure 2.
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Buying Piracy Reservation
qe
+(q − qe)k(ma1/m)−p2
qe
+(q − qe)k(ma1/m)
−λ2ci
b¯
2.1 2.2 2.3
Action at
time 1
Action at
time 2
Expected
payoffs
at time 2
Reservation
Figure 2: User’s i decision tree at time 2
(choice for those users that chose the reservation strategy at time 1)
In the limit case where two payoffs are equal (i.e. when two strategies yield exactly
the same level of utility), we assume that potential users always prefer legal purchase
to piracy or reservation, on the one hand, and piracy to reservation on the other hand.
Comparison of users’ payoffs as defined in Figures 1 and 2 leads to Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. At time 1, users cannot distribute among Strategy 1.1 (buying at time 1)
and 1.3 (reservation at time 1 and expected purchase at time 2), or among 1.1 and 1.5
(reservation at time 1 and expected reservation at time 2), or among 1.3 and 1.5. At time
2, users who previously chose the reservation strategy cannot distribute among Strategy
2.1 (reservation at time 1 and buying at time 2) and 2.3 (reservation at time 1 and 2).
Proof : Since users differ by their piracy cost ci and not by their willingness to pay, the
payoff associated with Strategy 1.1 is greater than or equal to (resp. less than or equal
to) the payoff associated with Strategy 1.3 whatever i(i = 1, 2 . . .m). That is, potential
users all prefer either 1.1 to 1.3 or vice versa but all users make the same decision. The
same deductions apply to the comparison of the payoffs associated with 1.1 vs 1.5, 1.3 vs
1.5, 2.1 vs 2.3 
3.1.2 Outcomes of the game matching the publisher’s optimal decisions
Lemma 1 helps to reduce the number of possible outcomes of the game. However, the
number of these outcomes can still be high. On the software publisher’s side, it is obviously
not optimal to choose some values of the control variables {q, p1, pa2, p2, λ1, λa2, λ2} such
that all potential users would adopt the software at time 1 or 2 by getting unauthorized
copies of it only. Thus, and because the publisher plays first, we can consider only those
strategies compatible with optimal actions on the publisher’s side, which significantly
reduces the final number of candidate outcomes.
As a consequence, a distribution of users such that all of them would choose Strategy
1.2 (early piracy) is excluded since it would result in a zero profit. In the same way, at
time 2, the publisher should ensure that at least one part of those who did not adopt, will
buy the software. Therefore, a situation where all potential users would choose Strategy
2.2 (delayed piracy) and/or 2.3 (reservation) is never optimal for the publisher. We set
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aside these outcomes.
Also, our objective in this paper is to identify the conditions for a distribution strategy
based on piracy to be profitable. For that, we need to ensure that a strategy that would
deter piracy completely is at least feasible and compatible with users’ incentives. If the
publisher is able to deter piracy totally but does not do so, this means that it is in its
interest to tolerate piracy. This leads to Assumption 3 which excludes the case where
some users might find it optimal to get unauthorized copies while at the same time the
publisher enforces the maximum monitoring level.5.
Assumption 3. Enforcing the maximum monitoring level (λt = 1, t = {1, 2}) discour-
ages the user endowed with the lowest piracy cost from getting unauthorized copies of the
software at time t.
Given Assumption 3 and the expected payoffs associated with each user’s strategy, we
can formulate Lemmas 2 to 5.
Lemma 2. When some sales occur at time 1, the publisher will never choose λ1 < 1.
Proof : The publisher chooses the control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2} such that at least one
fraction of all potential users chooses Strategy 1.1. Given Lemma 1, potential users
distribute among Strategies 1.1 and/or 1.2 and/or 1.4. If the publisher chooses λ1 = 1,
Strategy 1.2. is dominated (cf. Assumption 3). Decreasing λ1 below its maximum level
λ1 = 1 leads either to a decrease in sales at time 1 (because part of the potential users
may choose Strategy 1.2 rather than 1.1) or to a decrease in sales at time 2 (because part
of the potential users may choose 1.2 rather than 1.4, meaning fewer users choosing 2.1
at time 2) 
Corollary 1. When some sales occur at time 1, users cannot distribute among Strategy
1.1 (early buying) and Strategy 1.2 (early piracy).
The publisher may induce some users to choose Strategy 1.2 in order to diffuse infor-
mation about software quality. This word-of-mouth process should provide incentives for
reluctant users to buy the software at the next time period. However, when some sales
are made at time 1, it is always more profitable for the publisher to diffuse information
through buyers rather than to do it through unauthorized users, given that users never
buy the software once it has been previously illegally acquired.
Lemma 3. The publisher never chooses λ2 < 1.
Proof : If some sales are made at time 1 for the control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2}, all the
values of λ2 ensure this equilibrium, and in particular λ2 = 1. If some sales are made at
time 2, any decrease in λ2 below its maximum level λ2 = 1 may affect sales. Given the
payoffs associated with the strategies 2.1 and 2.2, the effect on sales, whatever is p2, is a
decrease in sales at time 2: decreasing λ2 therefore, is inefficient for the publisher’s side

5This inverse situation is investigated in Darmon et al. [2009] in a close but simplified setting in which
the timing of adoption is the same but in which there is no opportunity for the software publisher to change
its announced strategy between the two rounds. One key result of the present paper (Proposition 1)
would be preserved. That means that Assumption 3 is not necessary for our result to hold. However, this
working hypothesis considerably simplifies the presentation of the model to enable a complete treatment
of strategic announcements.
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Corollary 2. The publisher always chooses its control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2} such that
no potential user selects Strategy 2.2.
These Lemmas and their corollaries indicate that the publisher should implement a
permissive strategy towards piracy only at time 1, only if there are no sales at time 1.
Lemma 4. The publisher never announces the control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2} such that
no adoption will take place at time 1.
Proof : let us compare the profit associated with the values of the variables such that all
potential users will adopt the software at time 2 with no early adoption, with the profit
associated with the values of the control variables such that all potential users will adopt
the software at time 1. In both cases, the profit is written as pit = mpt − C.
Consider first the case where the publisher announces the control variables {p1, pa2, λ1, λa2}
such that no user adopts at time 1. Given Lemma 3, we know that the publisher will
choose λ2 = 1 and given Assumption 3, we deduce no potential user will choose Strategy
2.2. In this context, the publisher should choose p2 as high as possible (note that the
profit is linear in p2) but such that users still prefer 2.1 rather than 2.3, i.e. : p2 ≤ qe − b¯
which is associated with the following profit : piχ = m(qe − b¯)− C.
Now consider the situation where the publisher announces a set of control variables
{p1, pa2, λ1, λa2} such that all users will adopt the software at time 1. In this case, the
control variables pa2, λ1 and λ
a
2 have to be sufficiently high.
Given Assumption 3, we know that 2(qe − b¯) ≤ c + qe − b¯. This inequality ensures
that if potential users prefer Strategy 1.1 to 1.5, they will also prefer Strategy 1.1 to 1.4.
Since the profit is an increasing function of p1, the optimal value of p1 is defined by the
more restrictive constraint, i.e. p1 < 2(q
e − b¯). In this situation, the profit would be
piψ = 2m(qe − b¯)− C in this situation.
Comparing the two profits reveals that piψ > piχ whatever the values of the parameters,
i.e. it is always more profitable to sell the software at time 1 rather than to sell it at time
2 if no potential users adopted at time 1 
We can deduce from Lemma 4 that the publisher should always announce a set of
control variables such that one part of potential users chooses Strategy 1.1 (early buying)
or Strategy 1.2 (early piracy).
Lemma 5. The publisher never announces:
(i) a price pa2 inferior to p1 or a monitoring level λ
a
2 inferior to λ1 when sales are made
at time 1 at equilibrium,
(ii) a monitoring level λa2 inferior to λ1 when sales are only made at time 2 at equilibrium.
Proof : (i) At equilibrium, if sales are made at time 1 at the price level p1, announcing
pa2 < p1 will have no effect if p
a
2 > p1 − (qe − b¯). Otherwise, if pa2 < p1 − (qe − b¯), then all
potential users prefer Strategy 1.3 to Strategy 1.1, i.e. no potential user buys the software
at time 1, which is not compatible with the case studied here.
(ii) At equilibrium, if it is more profitable to sell at time 2 rather than to sell at time 1,
the publisher should accommodate some piracy at time 1 (cf. Lemma 4). The optimal
level of piracy at time 1 can be determined thanks to the monitoring level λ1. Announcing
that λa2 is less than λ1 either may have no incidence or may restrict the level of piracy at
time 1 (if the value of λa2 is rather low). Any increase in λ1 however has the same effect.
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Since any change in the optimal proportion of unauthorized users obtained by λa2 can also
be obtained by a change in the level of λ1, it is not necessary at time 2 to announce a
lower monitoring level than the one chosen at time 1 
Corollary 3. It is not possible to have, simultaneously, some potential users choosing
Strategy 1.2 (piracy at time 1) and some choosing Strategy 1.4 (reservation at time 1 and
expectation of piracy at time 2).
Given Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and their corollaries, only four outcomes of the game
are possible (cf. Figure 3).
1.1︷ ︸︸ ︷.............................................................
c¯c
¶
1.5︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................
..............................︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.1
1.2︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................
c¯c
·
1.1︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................1.4︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................
..............................︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.1
c¯c
¸
1.3︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................1.2︷ ︸︸ ︷..............................
..............................︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.1
c¯c
¹
Figure 3: The four outcomes of the game
3.2 The publisher’s strategies
As depicted in Figure 3, the four outcomes of the game fall into two categories. On the
one hand, Outcomes ¶ and · are characterized by non-misleading announcements (price
and monitoring levels announced at time 0 are those implemented at time 2). However,
Outcomes ¶ and · differ in the level of quality q chosen by the publisher. On the other
hand, outcomes ¸ and ¹ are both based on misleading announcements. Note that these
two outcomes correspond to the choice of a ‘high’ quality software (q = q¯).
Hence, in the latter two cases, cheating is a part of the publisher’s strategy. In Out-
come ¸, the publisher announces a monitoring level λa2 6= λ2 which it will not make
effective at time 2. The level of λa2 announced at time 1 must be sufficiently low to mo-
tivate some users to choose Strategy 1.4. However, given Lemma 3, it is always optimal
for the publisher to implement λ2 = 1 at time 2, whatever her announcement at time
0. In Outcome ¹, the publisher announces a price pa2 lower than the price p1, with the
objective of motivating some users to postpone their purchase to time 2 instead of getting
unauthorized copies of the software at time 1 (Strategy 1.3). In this case, the publisher
has no interest in confirming such a low price at time 2 since the previous diffusion of
favourable information about software quality enables the software publisher to sell it at
a higher price.
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In the following sections, we study the publisher’s strategies associated with each
outcome of the game. For each case, we express the associated profit and determine the
optimal strategy corresponding to this profit. We then separate the outcomes of the game
associated with strategies based on non-misleading announcements (i.e., strategies such
that the level of price and monitoring announced at time 0 is effective at time 2) from
the outcomes associated with strategies based on misleading announcements.
We develop only those strategies associated with the game Outcomes ¶, · et ¸.
Outcome ¹ is not analyzed in details here. Indeed, while Outcomes · and ¹ correspond
to different announcements made by the publisher, they correspond to exactly the same
distribution of potential users among strategies. In each case, some users choose piracy
during the early adoption stage while the others initially wait during that time period and
end up buying the software at time 2. In each case, the same proportion of users finally
buys the software at time 2, and at the same price. As a consequence, the publisher’s
profit is the same for the publisher for both outcomes. For reputation reasons, it seems
realistic to suppose that the publisher might select a strategy based on cheating only if
doing so allows it to earn an additional profit. Since this does not apply to the case here,
Outcome ¹ will never by considered as a relevant strategy by the publisher.
3.2.1 Publisher’s optimal strategy with non-misleading announcements
Among the three possible publisher strategies, two are based on non-misleading announce-
ments. For these two latter cases, the publisher announces at time 0 the price and the
level of control that he will actually implement at time 2. These outcomes correspond to
opposite attitudes of the publisher towards piracy:
• Anti-piracy policy (labelled Strategy A): the publisher determines the optimal level
of {p1, pa2, p2, λ1, λa2, λ2, q} such that all users will buy legally during time 1;
• Permissive policy (labelled Strategy B): the publisher determines the optimal level
of {p1, pa2, p2, λ1, λa2, λ2, q} such that no user will buy during time 1 but some will do
so at time 2.
At Stackelberg equilibrium, the publisher’s Strategy A is only compatible with the dis-
tribution of users associated with Outcome ¶, while Strategy B is only compatible with
the distribution of users associated with Outcome ·. We now consider the publisher’s
strategies A and B and the associated potential distribution of users.
Strategy A : In this case, the publisher determines the levels of its control variables
so that all buyers buy at time 1. However, potential users choose to actually buy the
software only if Strategy 1.1 (early purchase) gives them a utility level greater than the
utility they would obtain with another strategy, whatever their piracy cost ci. In this
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case, the utilities of users must satisfy the following conditions (i ∈ [0,m]) :
1.1
i 1.2 ⇔ p1 ≤ λ1c
1.1
i 1.3 ⇔ p1 ≤ pa2 + (qe − b¯)
1.1
i 1.4 ⇔ p1 ≤ λa2c+ (qe − b¯)
1.1
i 1.5 ⇔ p1 ≤ 2(qe − b¯)
These four conditions jointly provide an upper bound for p1. Given Assumptions 2
and 3, the first and third inequalities are satisfied as soon as the publisher announces and
applies the maximum level of control, i.e. when λ∗1 = 1 and λ
a∗
2 = 1. As a consequence
of Lemma 5, the publisher never chooses a price pa2 smaller than p1 when the software is
sold at time 2: the second inequality then is also verified when the publisher wants to
sell at time 1. Given Assumption 2, there is a non-empty subset of positive values of p1
satisfying the last inequality. Then, whatever the values of the utility parameters, there
exists a compact and non-empty subset of values for p1 that satisfy the four inequalities.
In order to determine the optimal level of the control variables compatible with this
strategy, note that, for a price p1 belonging to the compact set C defined by the four
strategies and given Expression (1), the profit associated with the choice of Strategy A
by the publisher can be expressed as follows: piA(q, p1) = mp1 − C(q).
This expression always increases with p1, and consequently its maximal value is ob-
tained for the highest value of the price p1 in the compact set C. Given the definition
of C(q), the lowest possible quality level for the advanced functionalities is also optimal,
given the impossibility to observe this quality at the time of full adoption. Since adoption
ends up at time 1, the actual price p∗2 and the control levels λ
∗
2 cannot be observed by
users, and the optimal level of these variables are then indeterminate. Because of this,
the publisher has no interest to cheat and to announce false levels of future price and
monitoring levels (i.e. levels that will not be implemented in time 2). Assumption 3 ex-
cludes that the optimal price level p1 could bind the constraints associated with 1.1
i1.2
and 1.1
i1.4. Similarly, Lemma 5 excludes that the constraint associated with 1.1 i1.3
could be bounded. The constraint associated with 1.1
i1.5 then is always bounded and
the optimal solution has the form {q∗ = b, p∗1 = pa∗2 = 2(qe − b¯), λ∗1 = 1, λa∗2 = 1, p∗2, λ∗2},
where p∗2 and λ
∗
2 take indeterminate values.
If the publisher selects Strategy A, it then chooses the maximum monitoring level.
This choice increases the propensity of early adopters that prefer to buy rather than to
get unauthorized copies. The publisher then chooses a minimal quality for the advanced
functionalities of the software: since potential users have all adopted at time 1, revelation
of the low quality of the software at time 2 has no influence on the publisher’s profit. Then
the profit-maximizing quality level is also the one that minimizes the publisher’s costs.
Last, the publisher chooses for time 1 a price such that all users would immediately buy
the software instead of getting unauthorized copies of the software. It is then sufficient
that the publisher announces a sufficiently high price pa2 to discourage any attempt by
users to wait until time 2 to adopt. By substituting the optimal value of control variables
in the profit, we obtain:
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piA
∗
= 2m(b+ qe − b¯)− C (2)
In the case of Strategy A, we can fully specify Assumption 3: :
c > 2(b+ qe − b¯) (3)
Strategy B: The publisher here determines the level of its control variables such that
all potential users that chose the reservation strategy at time 1, finally buy the software at
time 2. Given Lemmas 2 and 5, there is no possibility for having simultaneously some users
who buy the software at time 1 and others who intend to buy it at time 2. Given Lemma
4, software adoption cannot be postponed by any motive other than a positive revision
to the expected software quality resulting from the diffusion of favourable information
disclosed by early unauthorized users. Given Lemmas 4 and 5, this permissive strategy
then is compatible with the distribution of users defined by Outcome ·. Consequently,
Strategy B is optimal for the publisher if the information disclosed by early unauthorized
users is favourable to the editor and sufficiently large. At time 1, the publisher must then
choose a price p1 and a future control level λ
a
2 = 1 sufficiently high to deter potential
users from purchase at time 1 or from unauthorized adoption at time 2. This choice leads
to the following conditions (i ∈ [0,m]) :
1.5
i 1.1 ⇔ p1 > 2(qe − b¯)
1.5
i 1.3 ⇔ pa2 > b+ qe − b¯
1.5
i 1.4 ⇔ λa2c > qe − b¯
The last inequality is always verified if λa2 = 1. It is indeed sufficient for the publisher to
announce a maximal level of control at time 2 (which it will automatically do given Lemma
5) in order to ensure that Strategy 1.5 is preferred to Strategy 1.4 given Assumption 3.
At the same time, the publisher must select a monitoring level sufficiently permissive to
motivate some users to get unauthorized copies at time 1. Consequently, potential users’
choices are such that some (but not all) of them prefer to adopt through piracy at time 1
instead of waiting for some new information and, if relevant, potentially adopting later.
Two conditions are then associated to these choices:
cλ1 < 2
(
qe − b¯) ≤ c¯λ1
When these two conditions are verified, potential users distribute in each time period
and for the two time periods according to the outcome defined by Outcome ·, and the
piracy cost of the “marginal unauthorized user” at time 1 is c∗i =
2(qe−b¯)
λ1
. At time 2, the
potential users who have not yet adopted, all buy. For all users i whose piracy cost is
between c∗i et c¯, the following conditions then hold: 2.1
i2.2 ⇔ p2 ≤ λ2c
2.1
i2.3 ⇔ p2 ≤ qe − b¯+
k(q−qe)( 2(qe−b¯)
λ1
−c)
c¯−c
The profit associated with Strategy B can be expressed as: piB(p2, λ1, q) =
c¯− 2(qe−b¯)
λ1
c¯−c mp2−
C(q).
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Given the linearity of the profit function with respect to p2, the definition set of p2
is compact. Because of Assumption 3, the first inequality (p2 ≤ λ2) is always checked:
as a consequence, the value of p2 which maximizes the profit pi
B(p2, λ1, q) is defined by
the upper bound of the second inequality, i.e. p2 = q
e − b¯ + k(q−q
e)(
2(qe−b¯)
λ1
−c)
c¯−c . This value
of p2 then can be substituted into the profit function. The costs properties define a
corner solution value q∗ = q¯ for software quality. Given Lemmas 4 and 5, λ∗2 = λ
a∗
2 = 1.
The optimal solutions p∗2 et λ
∗
1 are deduced from the first order conditions and from the
boundary values of the control variables:
p∗2 =
1
2
[qe − b¯+ k (q¯ − qe)]
λ∗1 =
4(qe − b¯)(q¯ − qe)k
(c¯+ c)(q¯ − qe)k − (c¯− c)(qe − b¯)
¿From the previous conditions, we can deduce the optimal values of the control
variables {p1, pa2, λ2, λa2} which only intervene indirectly in the profit expression: {p∗1 >
2(qe − b¯), pa2∗ = p∗2 = 1/2(qe − b¯+ k(q¯ − qe), λ∗2 = λa2∗ = 1}
Note however that the optimal level of control λ1
∗ is greater than zero as soon as the
following inequality is satisfied:
k ≥ q
e − b¯
q¯ − qe (4)
In other words, if, for a given level of initial expectations about software quality, the
magnitude of information diffusion about software quality is not sufficiently good between
the two periods, then the publisher will have to choose a monitoring level equal to zero:
all potential users should then choose piracy, which is incompatible with Strategy B.
When Condition (4) is satisfied, this case is excluded. Thus, this condition, which states
that the level of initial expectations is not too low compared to the potential diffusion of
information between the two periods, is a necessary condition for Strategy B to be used
by the publisher.
It is important to note that if the condition defined by Equation (4) holds, and if the
inequalities associated with Assumption 3 are checked, then λ∗1 is always smaller than 1.
In other words, if it can be shown that for some parameter values, Strategy B is optimal
for the publisher, it can be shown also that the publisher has an incentive to adopt a
permissive strategy regarding piracy.
After substituting the optimal values of the control variables in the profit, we obtains:
piB
∗
=
m(qe − b¯+ k(q¯ − qe))2
4k(q¯ − qe) − C (5)
In the case of Strategy B, Assumption 3 can be fully specified:
c >
1
2
((qe − b¯) + (q¯ − qe)k) (6)
Finally, we need to determine whether Strategy B might be a dominant strategy for
the publisher. To do so, we compare the optimal profits associated with Strategies A and
B (piA
∗
and piB
∗
respectively) from which Proposition 1 is deduced:
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Proposition 1. Under certain conditions, a permissive attitude towards piracy during
the initial adoption stage (λ1 < 1) is optimal for the software publisher.
Proof. Let us consider the situation where Strategies A and B are simultaneously possible
(i.e. parameter configuration such that Condition (4) holds). In this situation, piB
∗
> piA
∗
as soon as the information diffusion on software quality is sufficiently high and the provi-
sion cost of advanced functionalities is sufficiently low. Formally, Strategy B is optimal if
(i) k > (3 + 2
√
2) q
e−b¯
q¯−qe and (ii) C < C +
m(b¯2+6b¯kq¯+k2q¯2+2qe(−b¯(1+3k)−k(3+k)q)+qe2(1+6k+k2))
4k(q¯−qe) 
Proposition 1 states that implementing a policy that would deter all unauthorized
behaviour (i.e. λ = 1) is not always profitable. Even if deterring piracy is at no direct
cost, the software publisher might have an incentive to tolerate unauthorize behaviours
during the early adoption stage of its software. However, this should apply only if these
unauthorized behaviours succeed in providing incentives for other potential users to buy
the software later. A permissive policy towards piracy then is profitable under two kinds
of conditions. First, the publisher must propose a software of a sufficiently high quality
level (i.e. measured here by the amount of advanced functionalities provided to users),
since unauthorized users subsequently will contribute to the disclosure of this quality level
to potential buyers. On the contrary, if the software does not provide a sufficiently high
increase in utility to users (compared to some older-generation software as defined by the
reservation utility), the nature of the information disclosed by unauthorized users should
discourage potential buyers from later adoption. Second, we argue that the anti-piracy
policy should solve a trade-off between two elements. On the one hand, it should not be
so severe as to allow a large mass of unauthorized users to reveal favourable information
about quality or the magnitude of the externality from unauthorized to future legal users
will not be sufficient to induce future legal purchase. On the other hand, it should
not be so permissive as to induce too many potential users to get unauthorized copies.
The software publisher must use monitoring devices that allow it to adjust accurately
for the adequate number / proportion of unauthorized users. Proposition 1 states that
implementing a policy that would deter all unauthorized behaviour (i.e. λ = 1) is not
always profitable. Even if deterring piracy is at no direct cost, the software publisher
might have an incentive to tolerate unauthorize behaviours during the early adoption
stage of its software. However, this should apply only if these unauthorized behaviours
succeed in providing incentives for other potential users to buy the software later. A
permissive policy towards piracy then is profitable under two kinds of conditions. First,
the publisher must propose a software of a sufficiently high quality level (i.e. measured
here by the amount of advanced functionalities provided to users), since unauthorized
users subsequently will contribute to the disclosure of this quality level to potential buyers.
On the contrary, if the software does not provide a sufficiently high increase in utility to
users (compared to some older-generation software as defined by the reservation utility),
the nature of the information disclosed by unauthorized users should discourage potential
buyers from later adoption. Second, we argue that the anti-piracy policy should solve a
trade-off between two elements. On the one hand, it should not be so severe as to allow
a large mass of unauthorized users to reveal favourable information about quality or the
magnitude of the externality from unauthorized to future legal users will not be sufficient
to induce future legal purchase. On the other hand, it should not be so permissive as
to induce too many potential users to get unauthorized copies. The software publisher
must use monitoring devices that allow it to adjust accurately for the adequate number
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/ proportion of unauthorized users.
3.2.2 Publisher’s strategy with misleading announcements
Now suppose that the software publisher is able and willing to disclose misleading infor-
mation on the future levels of price and monitoring. Strategies A and B may still be used,
but a new strategy (Strategy C) is now available. It consists in announcing a later per-
missiveness towards piracy. However, this later permissiveness will not be implemented
and a non-accommodating strategy towards piracy is be implemented instead.
Strategy C: the publisher chooses the levels of the control variables such that some
users immediately buy the software while others plan to obtain it later through piracy.
Legal buyers disclose positive information that induces later adoption by other users.
However, those users finally are induced to buy the software since the level of monitoring
is increased to its maximum level. This strategy is thus based on a misleading announce-
ment about the future permissiveness towards piracy and matches the distribution of users
in Outcome ¸.
At time 1, the publisher should ensure that some users buy the software. This requires
the price p1 to be relatively low and the level of monitoring λ1 maximum. The following
three conditions then hold:
1.1
i1.2 ⇔ p1 ≤ λ1c
1.1
i1.3 ⇔ p1 ≤ pa2 + (b+ qe − b¯)
1.1
i1.5 ⇔ p1 ≤ 2(qe − b¯)
At the same time, the publisher has to pretend that it will be easier to get unauthorized
copies of the software at time 2. Those potential users who are the most able to get
unauthorized copies of the software then will believe that getting unauthorized copies of
it later (at time 2) is better than buying it immediately (at time 1). For that reason,
the current price must be quite high and the future monitoring level particularly low,
to provide an incentive for this delayed adoption by users. We then have to check the
following double inequality:
c <
p1 − (qe − b¯)
λa2
< c¯
If these two conditions are satisfied, the potential users’ choices lead them to be dis-
tributed on the segment [c, c¯] given by Outcome ¸. The potential user i who exhibits the
piracy cost c∗i =
p1−(qe−b¯)
λa2
is indifferent between buying and reservation at time 1. Note
that we consider strict inequalities, i.e. the piracy cost if the indifferent potential user (c∗i )
is strictly greater than c and strictly less than c¯. These strict inequalities are necessary to
ensure that potential users distribute among Strategy 1.1 (buying at time 1) and Strategy
1.4 (reservation at time 1 then piracy at time 2). Otherwise, the distribution of potential
users defined by Outcome ¸ would no longer hold and neither would do Strategy C.
At time 2, the publisher has to ensure that those users who have not adopted at time
1 will buy the software at time 2. Then the control variables are such that all potential
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users who have initially chosen Strategy 1.4 finally switch to Strategy 2.1: 2.1
i2.2 ⇔ p2 ≤ λ2c
2.1
i2.3 ⇔ p2 ≤ qe − b¯+
k(q−qe)(c¯− p1−(qe−b¯)
λa2
)
c¯−c
The profit associated with Strategy C is:
piC(p1, λ1, p2, λ
a
2, q) =
c¯− p1−(qe−b¯)
λa2
c¯− c mp1 +
p1−(qe−b¯)
λa2
− c
c¯− c mp2 − C(q)
Again (cf. Strategy B), the profit is linear with respect to p2. We thus need to bind
the more restrictive constraint on p2. Because of Assumption 3, the condition p2 ≤ λ2c is
always fulfilled and never saturated. Then, p∗2 = q
e − b¯+ k(q−q
e)(c¯− p1−(qe−b¯)
λa2
)
c¯−c .
Given the set of definition of the control variables, we have:
q∗ = q¯
1
2
p∗1 = 2(q
e − b¯)1
2
p∗2 =
1
2
[3(qe − b¯) + k (q¯ − qe)]
λa2
∗ =
2(qe − b¯)(q¯ − qe)k
(c¯+ c)(q¯ − qe)k − (c¯− c)(qe − b¯)
However, note that the control variables {pa2, λ1, λ2} that do not directly intervene in
the profit function have to match Strategy C, which implies pa2
∗ = p∗2 and λ
∗
1 = λ2
∗ = 1.
As for Strategy B, enough information needs to be disclosed to ensure that λa2
∗ is
different from 0 so that all potential users do not get unauthorized copies of the software
a time 2. We then have:
k ≥ q
e − b¯
q¯ − qe (7)
By replacing the optimal values of the control variables in the profit, we deduce:
piC
∗
= m(qe − b¯) + m(q
e + b¯+ k(q¯ − qe))2
4k(q¯ − qe) − C (8)
Finally, in the case of Strategy C, we can fully specify Assumption 3:
c >
1
2
(3(qe − b¯) + (q − qe)k) (9)
Condition 9 ensures that no potential users choose to get unauthorized copies at time
2 if the publisher chooses λ2 = 1 (Strategy 2.2 is then always dominated). Note that this
condition is stronger that Condition 6.
Proposition 2 follows from the comparison of the optimal profits associated with strategies
A, B and C.
Proposition 2. It could be profitable for the publisher to announce later permissiveness
towards piracy and ultimately to deter it.
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Proof. Consider that Condition (4) holds so that the publisher has to choose among
Strategies A, B and CWith the optimal profit levels associated with Strategy B and C
(expressed by Equations (5 and (8 respectively), we can write: piC
∗
= m(qe − b¯) + piB∗.
It can be seen that Strategy C will always be preferred to Strategy B. Comparison of the
profits associated with Strategies A and C (Equations 2 and 8 respectively) shows that
Strategy C will be preferred to Strategy A if the additional revenues derived from Strategy
C are counterbalanced by the additional costs, i.e. if m(q
e+b¯+k(q¯−qe))2
4k(q¯−qe) −m(qe− b¯) > C−C 
While Proposition 1 highlights the strategic publisher’s strategy of tolerance towards
piracy, Proposition 2 shows that it could be even more profitable to announce to users
future tolerance towards piracy, but not to commit to this announcement. Here, we
suppose that the publisher is able to make misleading announcements about its control
variables. That is, it is able to suggest a lower monitoring level at time 2 than the one
that is finally implemented. Thus, there can be an optimal strategy involving information
about software quality being disclosed by “buyer-testers” and not by “unauthorized users-
testers”. At time 2, those users who planned to get unauthorized copies of the software
will ultimately be induced to buy it, not only because of their better perception of the
software quality but also because piracy is impossible, since the publisher has chosen a
maximum monitoring level.
This strategy is the most profitable for the publisher since (i) all users buy the software
and (ii) the price paid by late adopters is finally higher (pC∗2 > p
B∗
2 ). Recall that the more
positive the information that is diffused about software quality (which depends on the
number of early adopters), the higher will be the utility of potential users at time 2, and
the higher the price of the software at time 2 (because it increases willingness-to-pay).
With Strategy B, users who provide information about software quality are unauthorized
users whereas with Strategy C they are buyers. For that reason, the software publisher
will do better from restricting the number of “unauthorized user-testers” than restricting
the number of “buyer-testers”. All things being equal, since more information diffuses
with Strategy C than with Strategy B, the price at time 2 will be higher with Strategy
C.
Note also that, rather surprisingly, with Strategy C, those who pay the higher price
are the users who are the better able to get unauthorized copies (lowest piracy cost).
In one sense, this outcome could be interpreted as some indirect intertemporal price-
discriminating mechanism. However, this strategy may raise some moral concerns since
the publisher intentionally lies about its future monitoring level to limit the number of
buyers at time 1 in order to increase the number of buyers at time 2. In adopting this
kind of strategy, the publisher may also loose credibility in the long run which may have
a negative impact on its ability to launch a new software or other kinds of products in a
repeated game.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Based on an original model, our work has several results. Extending some of the results
in Takayama [2009], our first result is to show that a distribution strategy based on piracy
and indirect sampling can be profitable. This strategy consists in choosing strategically
a permissive attitude towards piracy during some early adoption stage (Stage 1 in our
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model) and, thus, generating a word-of-mouth mechanism that helps to disclose informa-
tion about the software. This fosters future legal adoption of the software. Later, the
software may be sold at a higher price because the disclosed information has increased
the willingness to pay for legal buyers. The timing of adoption depends on users’ piracy
cost. Only those users endowed with lower piracy costs adopt during the pre-adoption
stage. Those users endowed with higher costs may wait and purchase legally in a second
step. From the software publisher’s perspective, we verified the optimality of permissive
policies towards piracy in a context where getting unauthorized copies of the software has
a cost for potential users and where the monitoring of unauthorized behaviours is costless
for publishers.
However, it can be argued that, in practice, the “fight” against piracy could generate
several types of costs : R&D costs associated with the development of new tracking tech-
nologies, administrative and legal costs linked to potential infringements of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). In our model, we deliberately assumed these costs to be zero. Do-
ing so enabled us to distinguish clearly between the benefits/costs associated with better
information disclosure through a word-of-mouth mechanism and those linked to a specific
type of monitoring technology (that would exhibit ad hoc cost conditions). Our results
are thus robust to various cost conditions for the monitoring activity. This assumption is
the more unfavourable to obtain this first result which in turn reinforces its robustness.
Indeed, considering alternative assumptions about piracy and control costs would simply
extend the range of the cases where permissive strategies are optimal.
Second, our setting explicitly integrates the announcement made by the publisher
about its present and future price and control policies. In this way, our model confirms
and extends some results already identified in the literature on piracy. In order to max-
imize its profit, the publisher can use not only its price and control policies but also
its - sincere or not - announcements about its future price and control policies. The
publisher can, for example, announce future levels of control of piracy that it does not
intend to apply. We showed that when this strategy and the permissive strategy are both
admissible, it is even more interesting to cheat - i.e. to announce a future permissive
policy that will not be effective - than to be permissive immediately. In this case, the
price of the software for the initial period is chosen sufficiently low to attractive those
potential users characterized by the the smaller propensity to download illegally (higher
piracy costs). These early adopters buy the software and diffuse favourable information
to later adopters. Early adopters transmit favourable information about software quality
to potential users who initially intended to acquire it illegally at the second time period.
This information increases their propensity to adopt. This is sufficient for the publisher
to apply an unexpected severe control policy to convert the “future unauthorized users”
into “current buyers” during the second time period.
These two results are based on two types of information asymmetry between the soft-
ware publisher and the potential users. A first type of asymmetry is information about
software quality: the software publisher knows the precise quality of the software while
potential users have to learn about it (either directly or indirectly). A second and more
subtle type of asymmetry is about the structure of the game and the way users form their
expectations. In this paper, we considered that users form basic expectations, meaning
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that they do not fully analyse the strategy of the software publisher and infer from it addi-
tional information. Namely, users are able to take the best decisions given the announces
of software publisher, but they are not able to imagine that software publisher could adapt
its announces to the nature of these decisions. This attitude seems reasonable: despite
not sophisticated, users’ decisions are rational. Conversely, more sophisticated users may
know the complete structure of the game and from that may infer some information from
observation of prices and monitoring levels and from the announcement made by the
publisher. For instance, assume that first time period adoptions come only from piracy.
Given the initial information, potential users can infer that if the publisher is rational,
it expects that subsequent diffusion of information by unauthorized users will increase
the propensity for remaining users to adopt (and their willingness to pay). From this
additional information, they may able better to assess the credibility of the publisher’s
announcement about future price and control strategies. In a longer version of this paper,
we analysed diverse degrees of sophistication about the rationality of the publisher and
the potential users.6 This analysis reveals that when the sophistication of expectations
increases, the “cheating strategy” can no longer be used by the software publisher. The
reason is that when the publisher announces a later decrease in the monitoring level, this
announcement is no longer credible: since the publisher can control potential unautho-
rized users without cost, it is never optimal for the publisher to be permissive during
the last time period when there is nothing to expect from last adopters in terms of in-
formation diffusion. Hence, potential users know that any announcement characterized
by a permissive strategy toward piracy during the last adoption stage, is not credible.
In contrast, the same increase in the level of sophistication of users and publisher con-
firms the optimality of the strategy analysed in Proposition 1. In particular, if potential
users observe that all adopt at the same time (or understand that prices make this early
adoption the optimal choice for all), they might conclude that software quality is low and
refuse to buy the software at time 1. Finally, the strategy including a controlled level of
piracy during the initial time period is revealed as the most robust when the degree of
sophistication of potential users increases.
More generally, these results cast doubt on the legitimacy of a technical or legal device
that potentially would exclude any type of piracy (if it were ever possible). As a full piracy
cannot be optimal, our model suggests instead more subtle strategies dealing with piracy.
Considering the broader debate on the scope and enforcement of IPR, this suggests that
some highly protecting legal devices even legitimated by the scope of IPR, may finally
not be fully enforced by the holder of these IPR. In the context of software adoption
(depending on e.g. the type of software and the amount of uncertainty associated with
software adoption), our model suggests that software publishers may decide not to fully
enforce these rights in certain contexts.
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